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Abstract
In this paper we propose a simple behavioral model to explain some of the 
stylized facts of asymmetric price rigidity, which are observed empirically. 
We assume that consumer-producers maximize reference-dependent utility, 
which   is   characterized   by   loss   aversion.   We   show   that   when   past 
consumption is taken as the reference by consumers, we will observe higher 
upward price rigidity. But when past consumption, past money holdings or 
past labor supply is taken as the reference by producers, we will observe 
higher downward price rigidity. Thus, we explain why price increases are 
more common than price decreases while price decreases are generally 
observed to be larger, why in the services industry we usually observe higher 
downward price rigidity, but for big customer-oriented corporations the 
opposite may sometimes be true, and others.
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1The advantage of a bad memory is that one enjoys
 several times the same good things for the first time.
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)
1. Introduction
Economic  decisions are made by human beings. But humans are not necessarily 
rational. They have feelings, emotions, memory,  habits. All these can influence their 
behavior. For example, once you go to a hairdresser and observe a price increase. The 
hairdresser explains that the price of vegetable oil has increased and she needs to cover her 
additional costs
1. The other day the price of vegetable oil falls, but the price of a haircut does 
not. You ask why. And the hairdresser explains that vegetable oil has nothing to do with a 
haircut… In fact, the hairdresser just enjoys higher her own consumption, while she does not 
agree to cut it in the other case.     
Indeed, there is a growing body of experimental literature which shows that individuals 
are not symmetric utility or profit maximizers as we think of them. In particular, two main 
deviations from this rule are observed. First, individuals compare their outcomes to some 
reference point, which can be either their previous outcome, or their expectation about the 
outcome, or something else. Second, individuals are much more averse to losses than 
comparable gains. This theory, initially proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and 
named “prospect theory” has become extremely popular
2 and influential, since it helps to 
explain numerous experimental findings of individual behavior going at odds with the 
traditional theory of rationality. For example, Masatlioglu and Uler (2007) find in their 
experiments that while the classical choice theory can explain around 58% of their data, the 
general model of Tversky and Kahneman (1991) explains approximately 90% of it.
Such deviations from classical rationality can explain why the hairdresser changes her 
prices asymmetrically. When the prices for her consumption goods rise, having the same 
1 This comes from the personal experience of the author in fall 2007 when the price of vegetable oil suddenly 
increased sharply, and this was widely broadcasted on TV. This only fact created a wave of price increases.
2 According to Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006), the paper by Kahneman and Tversky “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk” is the second most cited paper in Economics.
2revenues she will be able to consume less. This undesirable situation is avoided by raising her 
price as well. When the opposite situation happens, she can afford to consume more and she is 
happy with it. Also, having sufficiently inelastic demand, her price, being the observable 
characteristics of her performance to her, may serve as a reference point. Thus, a mere 
decrease in the price may be considered psychologically as a loss (in spite of the fact that her 
costs may have fallen) which is more painful than a satisfaction from a comparable price 
increase. Therefore, she will be reluctant to cut her price in response to a deflationary shock 
while she will easily increase her price in the other case.
Although asymmetric price rigidity is a widely documented phenomenon, the direction 
of the asymmetry is sometimes debated. One of the most extensive studies concludes that 
“The odds are better than two to one that the price of a good will react faster to an increase in 
the price of an important input than a decrease” (Peltzman, 2000). But Levy et al. (2006) find 
that while “small price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases for price 
changes of up to about 10 cents, there is no such asymmetry for larger price changes”. Indeed, 
price decreases are found to be quite common (around 40% of all price changes in the Euro 
area and 42% in the USA), and are usually observed to be larger (Álvarez et al., 2005, for the 
Euro area and Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, for the USA). 
The frequency and the magnitude of price adjustments is found to differ significantly 
across different sectors. The most striking contrast is documented between prices of services 
and manufacturing goods (services prices being much stickier) in both Euro area and the 
USA. Also price reductions in the service sector are very uncommon (only 20% of all price 
changes - see Dhyne et al., 2005).  Figure 1 illustrates this difference in price adjustments 
well, using an example of prices for gasoline and a haircut in Belgium. We see that while the 
price of gasoline falls during some periods, the price of a haircut does not. Also the price of 
gasoline is quite volatile, while the price of a haircut increases only occasionally. 
3Figure 1. Dynamics of prices of gasoline and a haircut in Belgium
Source: Álvarez et al. (2005). Actual examples of price trajectories 
from the Belgian CPI database. The prices are in Belgian Francs.
Another interesting observation is that big supermarket chains change prices much 
more often than small “corner shops”  (e.g. Baudry et al., 2004), and prices for food in 
supermarkets are more volatile than prices in restaurants, while both may buy the food from 
the same distributor for the same wholesale price. Clearly, menu costs alone will not explain 
this difference. 
There seems to be some pricing threshold within which prices do not change, and this 
threshold may be different for different sectors. Álvarez et al. (2005) find that it is around 
8-10% of the retail price. Pricing threshold is consistent with the menu cost hypothesis and 
other explanations for price stickiness, the most popular of which, according to survey data, 
are implicit
3 and explicit contracts for the Euro area (Fabiani et al., 2005) and judging quality 
by price for the USA (Blinder et al., 1998). 
 Although the above ‘pricing anomalies’ have been documented by numerous empirical 
studies, the theoretical explanations for them are rather limited. One of the main explanations 
of higher downward price rigidity, found in the literature, is a drift in the desired nominal 
price, which could be caused by a positive trend inflation (e.g. Ball and Mankiw, 1994). But 
3 Companies may prefer to change prices rarely in order to win customers’ loyalty, since the customers prefer 
certainty. 
4although inflation explains partially the observed asymmetries, it is not the whole story, since 
the same asymmetries were also observed in periods of low inflation and even deflation (Levy 
et al., 2006)!
Other explanations of downward price rigidity include a positive trend in desired mark-
ups (Dhyne et al., 2006), consumer search with reference prices (Lewis, 2003), tacit collusion 
among firms with the past price serving as a focal price (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 
1997), implicit coordination among firms in an industry to rise prices after a positive cost 
shock while not to reduce prices after a negative one (Bhaskar, 2002). Such explanations may 
indeed be relevant in some cases, but it is not clear why they might exist in the first place. For 
instance, why should the desired mark-up have a positive trend?
Motivated by the empirical findings described above, in this paper we pay attention to 
psychological   issues   which   may   affect   pricing   decisions   significantly,   but   have   been 
neglected in the literature. If individuals are not completely rational from the ‘classical point 
of view’, then the standard pricing rules coming from profit maximization principle do not 
work anymore. Thus, we propose a simple model where consumer-producers are behavioral 
and set prices which maximize their reference-dependent utility. In this model we show that 
asymmetric price rigidity will take place, and the direction of the asymmetry will depend on 
what is taken as the reference point. We show that when past consumption is taken as the 
reference, then we will observe higher upward price rigidity. But when either past money 
holdings or past labor supply is taken as the reference, we will observe higher downward 
price rigidity.  Then, depending on which effect dominates, we will observe different 
directions of the asymmetry. Thus, our model helps explain why, for example, in the services 
industry we usually observe higher downward price rigidity, but for big customer-oriented 
corporations the opposite may sometimes be true.  
5The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we lay out the theoretical model, describe 
the equilibrium and analyze different types of reference-dependence and their implications for 
the asymmetric price rigidity. Section 3 is devoted to discussion and conclusion.
  
2. The model 
2.1. Set-up of the model
Assume an economy populated by n identical consumer-producers, indexed by i, each of 
them producing her own differentiated good j (thus, n goods are produced). The goods are 
imperfect substitutes and the market is monopolistically competitive, so that each producer 
can set a price for her good, depending on the demand for it, which in turn depends on the 
competitors’ prices. 
Each consumer-producer extracts utility from her consumption  Ci,t  and real money 
balances Mi,t/Pt, but gets disutility from producing her good Yi,t. Following Kőszegi и Rabin 
(2006), who generalize the prospect theory of Kahneman и Tversky (1979), we assume that 
the utility function consists of two parts: 
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where the first component is the direct utility from current consumption, real money balances 
and work, while the second one is a behavioral reference-dependent utility, which represents 
additional gains or losses from deviation from a corresponding reference point R. 
We assume a standard direct utility function of the following form: 
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where Сi,t is a consumption index with a constant elasticity of substitution θ,  1 > q :
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The direct utility function (2) is characterized by diminishing marginal utility of 
consumption and real money balances and increasing marginal disutility of labor. High value 
of θ means the goods are close substitutes. 
From the CES property follows the demand for good j of individual i:
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We assume that the second gain-loss part of the utility function is additive and linear in 
deviations of a variable from the corresponding reference point:
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Each component of the gain-loss function (4) satisfies all the properties, specified in 
Kőszegi и Rabin (2006): for  ) ( ) ( ) ( x v R X v R X v
X X º - º ,  ( ) x v  is
1. continuous for all x, twice differentiable for  0 ¹ x  and ν(0)=0;
2. ν(x) is strictly increasing;
3. 0 ) ( = ¢ ¢ x m  for all  0 ¹ x ;
74. if y>x>0, then ν(y)+ν(-y)<ν(x)+ν(-x);
5. 1
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Property 3 assumes the constant marginal gain or loss from deviation of a variable from 
its reference point
4, while properties 4 and 5 assume loss aversion – a higher variable than its 
reference point yields lower gain than the loss from a similar negative deviation from the 
reference. In particular, our gain-loss function (4) means that the consumer gets lower 
additional utility from increased consumption, real money balances and decreased labor, than 
the additional disutility coming from decreased consumption, real money balances and 
increased labor. 
Figure 2 plots such gain-loss function (the solid line) as well as a symmetric gain-loss 
function (the dashed line) as a benchmark.
Figure 2. The gain-loss functions with and without loss aversion
 
g~ 
g d ~ up  
g d ~ down  
 ν 
 0 
   x 
It has been estimated empirically, that, on average, the losses are 2-2.5 times as high as 
the gains. Such loss aversion is a widely documented phenomenon, which has been supported 
by numerous experiments on people and even animals
5.
4 Kőszegi и Rabin (2006) propose a more general function, characterized by diminishing marginal gain or loss: 
0 ) ( " £ x v  for x>0 and  0 ) ( " ³ x v  for x<0. Here we assume the linear function for simplicity. 
5 Loss aversion appears to be linked to affect:
– loss aversion disappears in patients with brain lesions in regions related to affect,
– loss aversion is present in monkeys, who share our affective system but have a more limited cognitive system,
8We   further   assume   that   people   form   habits,   so   that   they   compare   the   current 
performance with the previous period performance. In other words, the reference for a 
variable is defined as the realization of this variable in the previous period:
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So, the consumer’s utility function (1) means, for example, that the consumer gets utility 
not only from the consumption itself, but also from the deviation of the consumption from the 
previous period consumption. If this deviation is positive, the consumer gets some additional 
satisfaction. If this deviation turns out to be negative, the consumer is more unhappy since she 
is used to this level of consumption already and treats this as a loss. Thus, the individual will 
behave asymmetrically putting more effort to escape negative deviations of consumption and 
real money balances and positive deviations of labor supply.
The consumer-producer’s budget constraint is the following:
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where  the left-hand side represents the consumer’s spending while the right-hand side 
represents her wealth, which is equal to the sales revenues Pi,tYi,t  plus endowment  t i M , .
2.2. Equilibrium
Assume for the moment that the wealth Ii,t is given. The consumer-producer maximizes 
the utility function (1) with respect to consumption and real money balances subject to the 
budget constraint (5). Then the demand functions for consumption and money are the 
following:
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– people predict that individuals experience more emotion if they fall short of a goal or reference point (David 
Huffman, IZA Bonn lecture notes, 2006).
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where  ) )( 1 ( 1 M C g g a a k - - - º ,  0 > k . It should be noted than if  0 = = M C g g  (there is no 
reference dependence) or   M C g g = , then κ=1 and the demand functions are standard. In 
general, consumption is decreasing in κ while money demand is increasing in κ. But κ in turn 
depends on the difference ( M C g g - ). The higher is this difference, the higher is the 
consumption demand and the lower is the money demand since these coefficients show 
additional marginal utility from consumption and money respectively.
From equations (6) and (8) it follows that if income increases from the previous period, 
consumption   and   money   demand   increase   proportionally   with   the   coefficient 
) ~ ~ ( ) 1 ( 1 M C
up up g g d a a k - - - º . But if income falls, then consumption and money demand 
fall with the coefficient  ) ~ ~ ( ) 1 ( 1 M C
down down g g d a a k - - - º . If  M C g g ~ ~ >  (the consumer cares 
about a change in consumption more than about a change in money), then  up down k k <  and 
consumption will fall more by the absolute value and the money demand will fall less than in 
the case of a similar increase. If  M C g g ~ ~ < , then  up down k k >  and consumption will fall less and 
the money demand will fall more. Thus, we see that the demand functions are asymmetric 
depending on the sign of the money supply change.   
From the individual demand for good j, represented by equation (7), we can find the 
aggregate demand for good j, that is the aggregate demand for producer i
6:
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6 Note that  i j P P º  according to the model set-up since each producer i produces her own good j.
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, , , ,  is the total real wealth in the economy, where Yt is 
the total real output and  t M  is the total nominal money supply.
In equilibrium total output equals total consumption:
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Substituting (10) into the demand function (9) we get the demand for producer i as a 
function of the total real money balances in the economy and her relative price:
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We see that the equilibrium output  is decreasing in κ in a similar way as the 
consumption in equation (6) does. The higher is γC and the lower is γM, the lower is κ and the 
higher is equilibrium output due to higher consumption. The change in the equilibrium output 
due to a change in the money supply depends on the direction of the change and the relative 
values of γC and γM. If, for example,  M C g g ~ ~ > , then  up down k k <  and a rise in the money 
supply leads to a smaller increase in output than the fall in the output due to a monetary 
contraction by the same size. This finding goes in line with the empirical evidence on 
asymmetric output reaction to positive and negative money supply shocks (e.g. Cover, 1992).
11Since each  consumer-producer is a price-maker, she will choose the price for her 
product Pi that will maximize her utility (1) subject to the demand constraint (11). Thus, 
plugging the consumption demand (6), the money demand (8), and then the demand for the 
output (11) into the utility function (1) and maximizing it we obtain the optimal price of a 
producer as a function of the money supply.
As above, the analysis crucially depends on the relative values of all three γ’s and 
becomes messy. Therefore, we will analyze the implications of reference-dependence in each 
component of the utility function (consumption, money and labor) separately.
2.2.1. Reference-dependence in consumption
In this part we assume that  0 ~ > C g  and  0 ~ ~ = = Y M g g . This means that the consumer 
only cares about a change in consumption, especially a negative change. 
Substituting the consumption demand (6) and the money demand (8) into the utility 
function (1), we get the target function of consumer-producer i given her optimal choices of 
consumption and money:
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Function (12) is similar to a standard profit function, except for the real money balances 
term and the past consumption term, which come from being a consumer as well.
Maximizing the utility function (12) with respect to the relative price subject to the 
demand constraint (11), we get the optimal price of consumer-producer i:
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12Since all producers are symmetric, in general equilibrium  1
*
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. Substituting this into 
equation (13) we get the equilibrium price level in the economy as a function of the money 
supply:
t C t M P 1
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Using numerical methods we find that the derivative of μC with respect to γC is positive 
(see appendix  1). This  means  that the higher is the marginal utility  from increased 
consumption, the higher is the price level for any level of the nominal money supply. 
As a benchmark case let us consider a situation when there is no reference dependence 
at all ( 0 ~ = C g ). Letters with primes denote the parameters in this case. Then,   k k > = 1 ' , 
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case the price level depends positively and symmetrically on changes in the money supply in 
the economy. 
When symmetric reference-dependence is added  ( C C g g ~ =   for both positive and 
negative changes), the price level will be higher given the same money supply. This happens 
because consumption and, hence, the demand for each good will be higher, given the same 
level of income, due to the additional marginal utility of increased consumption. Then the 
profit-maximizing producers will be able to charge higher prices. Also in this case positive 
and negative changes in the money supply will lead to the same by the absolute value changes 
in the price level no matter what is the direction of the change.
Now consider the loss aversion specified in (4). Assume that initially we are in the 
steady state when money supply does not change and the equilibrium price level is described 
by equation (14) with   ) ~ ( C C C g m m = . If the money supply increases (consumer  i  receives 
13some additional money endowment), the optimal response of the consumer is to increase her 
consumption. Then her marginal utility of the increased consumption is  C
up
C g d g ~ = , which 
enters the new demand function. Thus, the demand rises, but with a lower rate. As a result, the 
price level will rise by  + - + + D = D t C t M P 1
1
b m   where  ) ~ ( ) ~ ( C C C
up
C C g m g d m m < º
+ . 
If the money supply falls, the demand will fall by a greater amount. The corresponding 
marginal disutility from the lower consumption is  C
up
C
down
C g d g d g ~ ~ > = . The result of the fall 
in   consumption   is   a   fall   in   the   price   level   by   - - - - D = D t C t M P 1
1
b m ,   where 
) ~ ( ) ~ ( C C C
down
C C g m g d m m > º
- . The fall in the price level will be more significant than the rise 
in it in order to prevent consumption from falling by the same amount as it was rising in case 
of the money supply increase, and to prevent consumers from suffering more because of the 
loss aversion. Thus, in the case of reference-dependent consumption, we will observe a higher 
downward price adjustment than the upward price adjustment resulting from a positive shock 
of the same size. This case is illustrated in figure 3.
Figure 3. The equilibrium price level 
under reference-dependence in consumption
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142.2.2. Reference-dependence in labor supply
Here we assume  0 ~ > Y g  and  0 ~ ~ = = M C g g . This means that the individual’s utility is 
adversely affected by working more than in the previous period, because the additional work 
or effort is considered as a loss. 
In this case  1 = k  and the consumption demand (7) and the money demand (8) are no 
longer asymmetric in response to positive and negative changes in the money supply. Also the 
demand function (11) becomes symmetric, with the level of demand lower for any level of the 
real money balances.
Now the utility function (12) transforms into
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Again the utility function (15) is similar to a profit function, except for the real money 
balances and fact that here the profit-maximizing decisions are made not by completely 
rational calculating machines, but by humans who suffer more from additional work than 
benefit from less work.
 Maximizing the utility function (15) subject to the demand constraint (11) and using 
the equilibrium condition  1
*
, =
t
t i
P
P
, we get a similar expression for the equilibrium price level:
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It can be easily seen that  Y m  depends positively on Y g . Thus, the higher is the marginal 
disutility from additional work, the higher will be the price level for any level of the money 
15supply, since producers will be tempted to increase prices rather than increase output (work) 
in response to an increased demand due to higher money endowment. 
The relative  loss  aversion  in  labor  supply also  gives  rise to  asymmetric  price 
adjustments. But now the asymmetry is reversed. If the money supply increases, the demand 
for goods increases according to equation (11). In this case producers suffer from increased 
work   more,   and   they   will   increase   prices   by   + - + + D = D t Y t M P 1
1
b m ,   where 
) ~ ( ) ~ ( Y Y Y
down
Y Y g m g d m m > º
+ , in order to avoid some additional work. But when the money 
supply falls, the benefit from less work is not so significant, and the producers will be 
reluctant to cut prices as they would rather cut the production. Hence, the prices will fall by 
- - - - D = D t Y t M P 1
1
b m , where   ) ~ ( ) ~ ( Y Y Y
up
Y Y g m g d m m < º
- , which is less by the absolute value 
than  the corresponding  price  increase.  Thus,  we will observe lower  downward  price 
adjustments in the case of reference-dependent labor supply. This case is illustrated in figure 
4.
 Figure 4. The equilibrium price level 
under reference-dependence in labor supply
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162.2.3. Reference-dependence in money holdings
Now we assume  0 ~ > M g  and  0 ~ ~ = = Y C g g . Such reference-dependence means that an 
individual extracts additional utility from holding more money than before, but she becomes 
very unhappy if she has less money than before. 
Then  1 ) 1 ( 1 > - + = M g a a k  in equation (11). First, κ s higher than in the cases of 
reference-dependent consumption and labor. Hence, given the same real money supply, the 
demand for consumption is the lowest (equations (6), (7) and (11), while the demand for 
money is the highest (equation (8)). This is so because the consumer now values money more 
than consumption (for every level of α). 
Secondly, now the demand functions again become asymmetric for positive and 
negative changes in the money supply. A rise in the money supply increases consumption by 
more than the reduction in it due to a fall in the money supply. The opposite is true for the 
money demand. 
Repeating the same steps as in the previous sections, we again get a similar expression 
for the equilibrium price level:
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Using numerical methods, we find that   M m   decreases with increasing   M g   (see 
appendix 2). Therefore, the higher is the marginal utility from additional money holdings, the 
lower is the price level due to lower consumption. In other words, relative preference for 
savings reduces the equilibrium price level, as opposed to the relative preference for 
consumption.
Now we consider the asymmetry in the resulting price adjustments. A rise in the money 
supply increases the money demand and consumption, thus increasing the price level by 
17+ - + + D = D t M t M P 1
1
b m , where   ) ~ ( ) ~ ( M M M
up
M M g m g d m m > º
+ . But a fall in the money supply 
reduces the money demand by more and consumption by less, thus reducing the price level by 
- - - - D = D t M t M P 1
1
b m , where   ) ~ ( ) ~ ( M M M
down
M M g m g d m m < º
- , which is less significant. This 
happens because the producer wants to maintain her level of income in order to have her 
money holdings not significantly lower. In such a case we will observe lower downward price 
adjustments as in the case of reference-dependent labor supply (figure 4 again).  
2.3. Pricing thresholds
In the previous analysis we assumed that prices were flexible and changed whenever 
there was a demand shock. In reality there is some degree of price rigidity so that prices 
remain fixed within a band and change only in response to large enough shocks. This may be 
a consequence of menu costs, but empirical findings suggest that other factors are even more 
important for price stickiness. For example, Zbaracki et al. (2004) identify three types of 
managerial costs (information gathering, decision-making and communication costs) and two 
types of customer costs (communication and negotiation costs) in addition to menu costs and 
estimate that “the managerial costs are more than six times, and customer costs are more than 
twenty times, the menu costs”. Fabiani et al. (2005) and Blinder et al. (1998), using producer 
surveys, name the following factors as the main reasons for price rigidity:
18Table 1. Explanations of price rigidity
Hence, we assume that, for whatever reason, prices change only if the change goes 
beyond the threshold:
ï
î
ï
í
ì
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                                                                                               (18)
where 
+ x  and 
- x  are the upper and the lower bounds respectively,  0 >
+ x ,  0 <
- x . Then a 
positive money supply shock will affect the price level only if it satisfies inequality 
+ - + + > D x M t
b m 1
1
, where 
+ m  is 
+
C m , 
+
Y m , or 
+
M m  depending on which variable serves as the 
reference. Similarly, a negative money supply shock will affect the prices if  - - - - < D x M t
b m 1
1
. 
Clearly, if 
- + > m m  (as in the cases of reference-dependence in labor supply or money) the 
upward money supply shock can be less significant to induce a price change than a downward 
shock
7. Therefore, if the money supply shock is symmetrically distributed with the mean of 
zero, then the upward price adjustments will happen more often
8. But if positive and negative 
money supply shocks are large enough to induce price changes, then we will not observe any 
7 for the same levels of x.
8 If 
- + < m m  (reference dependence in consumption) then downward price adjustments will happen more often, 
but this can hardly be supported empirically, except for particular cases. 
19asymmetry in the frequency of positive and negative price changes. This explains why there is 
significant asymmetric price rigidity for small changes in prices while little or no asymmetry 
in the frequency of large changes, as documented by Levy et al. (2006).
Up to now nothing was said about the boundaries of the pricing rule (18) themselves. If 
- + = x x  the pricing threshold is symmetric. Then prices change upwards more often than 
they do downwards, but the minimum magnitude of the changes is the same. But the 
empirical finding that price reductions are generally observed to be larger than price increases 
(Álvarez et al., 2005, Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008) suggests that the pricing threshold is 
asymmetric, so that 
- + < x x . Then the asymmetry will be observed not only in the frequency, 
but also in the magnitude of price changes. Figure 5 illustrates both the symmetric and the 
asymmetric pricing thresholds.
Figure 5. Price adjustments under a pricing threshold
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The dashed line represents the lower bound if the threshold is symmetric, while the 
solid lines represent the asymmetric threshold, under which the downward price rigidity is 
even more pronounced and fits the observed pricing practices better. 
It should be noted that in the case of reference-dependent consumption while we will 
observe higher upward price rigidity under a symmetric pricing threshold, the direction of the 
asymmetry becomes uncertain under the asymmetric pricing threshold. 
203. Discussion and conclusion 
The observed asymmetries in frequency and magnitude of price adjustments in 
response to positive and negative shocks, as well as across different sectors of the economy, 
are difficult to explain with the use of traditional (rational) models of price setting. Although 
some explanations are provided, they are rather ad hoc, and it is not obvious why they may 
exist in the first place. 
In this paper we propose a behavioral model to explain some of the stylized facts of 
price  rigidity.  By  assuming   reference-dependent  utility  of price-setters,  which  is also 
characterized by loss aversion, we show that prices will respond by different magnitude to 
positive and negative shocks. Depending on which parameter is considered as the reference 
point, different directions of asymmetry will be observed.  
For example, when past consumption serves as the reference, consumers’ demand 
becomes asymmetric. A negative shock reduces consumption more significantly, and the 
optimal response of the producer is to cut prices further in order to attract some customers. 
But a positive shock raises consumption less, since the marginal utility gain from the 
increased consumption is lower than the marginal utility loss from the decreased consumption 
by the same magnitude. As a result, prices will rise less as well. Thus, higher upward price 
rigidity will be observed in pricing strategies of those companies which care a lot about their 
customer’ loyalty, e.g. small ‘corner’ shops or companies with permanent customers. Indeed, 
as noted by Blinder (1994), survey responses reveal that some companies do not adjust prices 
upwards frequently in fear that they will lose their customers. This is due to the ‘customer 
antagonization costs’ – the costs of ‘selling the new price to the customer’, which appear to be 
large (Zbaracki et al., 2004).  
Another   interesting   example   is   when   consumption   decisions   are   made   without 
references (and hence the demand is symmetric) but then the producer sets the price to 
21maximize her reference-dependent utility (profit) where her own past consumption is the 
reference. Then the producer will be reluctant to cut her price in response to a negative shock 
in order not to end up in a situation with her own consumption far below her previous 
consumption, which serves as the reference. In such a case we will observe higher downward 
price rigidity. This explanation is most relevant for the service industry, as well as other 
labor-intensive industries. 
A similar logic can be applied to companies which are thought to be rational profit 
maximizers. A rise it its costs for inputs reduces the mark-up, and hence may adversely affect 
the wages, directors’ remuneration or dividends. But since the recipients of these will be 
unhappy with their reduced consumption, the management of the company may be forced to 
raise the price to keep the mark-up. But when the price for inputs falls, everyone is happy 
with the higher mark-up, and the price does not change, although it might be more rational to 
cut the price to have even higher profits. As a result, we observe that a cost change is the main 
force to drive prices upwards, but not downwards (Peltzman, 2000, Fabiani et al., 2005). 
Such asymmetry in the treatment of mark-ups is a purely psychological phenomenon. 
There is sufficient empirical evidence that individuals are sick with money illusion and 
require periodical wage increases just in order to remain satisfied with their job (Grund and 
Sliwka, 2005)
9. Therefore, there is extremely high downward wage rigidity in the labor 
market   (e.g.   Altonji   and   Devereux,   1999;   Holden   and   Wulfsberg,   2004;   Holzer   and 
Montgomery, 1993), which may also be a reason for the higher downward price rigidity.
The same downward price rigidity is observed when either past labor supply or money 
holdings is taken as the reference. Again, this may be a good explanation for labor-intensive 
works, e.g. taxi drivers or hairdressers. In general, we find just one possible reason for higher 
9 Grund and Sliwka (2005) model theoretically and support empirically, that people get unhappier over time. 
They explain this by the fact that individuals get utility from work which depends not only on the absolute wage 
level, but also on the level of the wage increase. Since attaining further wage increases on the same job is more 
and more costly, people get less satisfied with their job over time.  
22upward price rigidity, while three reasons for higher downward price rigidity. This goes in 
line with the empirical evidence, that downward price rigidity is more common (it takes place 
in two out of three cases, according to Peltzman, 2000). Then, adding an asymmetric pricing 
threshold, we explain why price increases happen more often, while price decreases are 
generally larger in value.  
Ellingsen, Friberg and Hassler (2005) claim that a convex constant elasticity demand 
curve may be the source of the downward price rigidity since it entails relatively greater 
losses from negative price deviations. In this paper we make a step further and explain why 
such convex (kinked, in our case) demand curve may exist. Our model also gives, although 
implicitly, some explanation why there may be a positive drift in the desired price (Ball and 
Mankiw, 1994) and mark-ups (Dhyne et al., 2006), consumer search with reference prices 
(Lewis, 2003), tacit collusion among firms with the past price serving as a focal price 
(Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 1997), implicit coordination among firms in an industry to 
rise prices after a positive cost shock while not to reduce prices after a negative one (Bhaskar, 
2002). All these “frictions” have been proposed to explain asymmetric price rigidity, but 
nothing was said why such frictions may exist. We claim that all these may come from 
irrational behavior of economic agents, who compare the current outcome to the previous one 
and treat their gains and losses differently.
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Appendix 1.
Coefficient in equation (13) as a function of gamma 
consumption for different levels of alpha 
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25Appendix 2.
Coefficient in equation (17) as a function of gamma money 
for different levels of alpha
gamma money
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